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I. Introduction 
 
In 1983, Ireland became the first country in the world to constitutionalize fetal rights.
1
 
The 8
th
 Amendment to the Constitution, passed by a referendum of the People, 
resulted in constitutional protection for “the right to life of the unborn”, which was 
deemed “equal” to the right to life of the “mother”.2 Since then, enshrining fetal rights 
in constitutions and in legislation has emerged as a key part of anti-abortion 
                                                        

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My thanks to Sandra Fredman, Shreya Atrey, Meghan Campbell, Max Harris, Barbara Havelkova, 
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Taylor for comments and discussions of earlier drafts and/or the argument in this paper. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
 
1
 Notably, the 1978 American Convention on Human Rights provides, in Article 4.1, that “Every 
person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from 
the moment of conception”. However, in 1983 Ireland was the first country to provide constitutional 
protection to the right to life of the fetus. 
2
 Constitution of Ireland (1937), Article 40.3.3. 
 2 
campaigning. In this respect, attempts to create fetal personhood laws in Colorado and 
North Dakota in November 2014 and the attempt constitutionalize fetal rights in 
Wisconsin in 2013 are notable examples. The constitutions of Hungary,
3
 the 
Dominican Republic,
4
 Ecuador,
5
 El Salvador,
6
 Guatemala,
7
 Madagascar,
8
 Paraguay,
9
 
and the Philippines
10
 now include fetal rights. The new Kenyan constitution declares 
“The life of a person begins at conception”,11 although abortion is not fully prohibited 
in that jurisdiction,
12
 and the constitutions of Somalia and Swaziland make express 
reference to abortion, permitting it only in limited circumstances.
13
 
 
                                                        
3
 The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011), Freedom and Responsibility, Article II (“the life of the 
foetus shall be protected from the moment of conception”). 
4
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic (2010), Title II, Chapter I, Section I, Article 37 (“The right to 
life is inviolable from conception to death…”). 
5
 Constitution of Ecuador (2008; revised 2011), Title II, Chapter 3, Section 5, Article 45 (“…The State 
shall recognize and guarantee life, including care and protection from the time of conception”). 
6
 Constitution of El Salvador (1983; revised 2003), Title 1, Article 1 (amendment introduced in 
1999)(“[The State] recognizes as a human person every human being since the moment of 
conception”). 
7
 Constitution of Guatemala (1985; revised 1993), Title II, Chapter I, Article 3 (“The State guarantees 
and protects the human life from its conception…”) 
8
 The Constitution of Madagascar (2010) protects “the right to the protection of health” for all persons 
“from their conception” in Title II, Sub-Title II, Article 19. 
9
 Constitution of Paraguay (1992; revised 2011), Part I, Title II, Chapter I, Section I, Article 4 (“The 
right to life is inherent to the human person. Its protection is guaranteed, in general, from conception”). 
10
 Constitution of the Philippines (1987), Article II(12) (“The State…shall equally protect the life of the 
mother and the life of the unborn from conception”). 
11
 Constitution of Kenya (2010), Article 26(2). 
12
 Id., Article 26(4) provides “Abortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion of a trained health 
professional, there is need for emergency treatment, or the life or health of the mother is in danger, or if 
permitted by any other written law”. 
13
 Constitution of Somalia (2012), Article 15(5) (“Abortion is contrary to Shari'ah and is prohibited 
except in cases of necessity, especially to save the life of the mother”; Constitution of Swaziland 
(2005), Article 15(5) (“Abortion is unlawful but may be allowed” on medical and therapeutic grounds 
(Article 15(5)(a)), “where the pregnancy resulted form rape, incest or unlawful sexual intercourse with 
a mentally retarded female” (Article 15(5)(b)), or where otherwise provided for by law (Article 
15(5)(c)). 
 3 
This article traces the constitutionalization of fetal rights in Ireland and its 
implications for law, politics and women. In so doing, it provides a salutary tale of 
such an approach. More than thirty years after the 8
th
 Amendment it has become clear 
that Ireland now has an abortion law regime that is essentially ‘unliveable’.14 Not only 
that, but it has a body of jurisprudence so deeply determined by a constitutionalized 
fetal rights orientation that law, politics and medical practice are deeply impacted and 
strikingly constrained.
15
 This is notwithstanding the clear hardship that women in 
Ireland experience as a result of constitutionalized fetal rights and the resultant 
almost-total prohibition on accessing abortion in Ireland.  
 
This article argues that, wherever one stands on the question of whether legal abortion 
ought to be broadly available in a particular jurisdiction, constitutionalizing fetal 
rights leaves no meaningful space for judgement at either political or personal levels. 
Rather, the outcome of all arguments for a more liberal abortion law regime is 
effectively pre-determined in the negative. Furthermore, constitutionalizing fetal 
rights can have unforeseen implications across jurisprudence and medical practice, 
creating a situation in which there is essentially no space for more liberal 
interpretations that respect women’s reproductive autonomy. While this may be 
desirable from an ideological perspective for those who hold a firm anti-abortion 
position, it is distinctively problematic for women and for politics.  
 
This article first outlines the current law on abortion in Ireland, and then traces the 
constitutionalization of fetal rights by reference to the various constitutional referenda 
that have been held on the issue. The implications of that constitutionalization are 
then considered in respect of the development through litigation of a corpus of fetal 
                                                        
14
 This phrase is owed to Ruth Fletcher, Making Law Liveable: Bringing Feminist Knowledge of Care 
into the Curriculum, Revaluing Care Research Network, 25 February 2015. Available online at 
http://revaluingcare.net/making-law-liveable-bringing-feminist-knowledge-of-care-into-the-
curriculum/ (last accessed 22 March 2015).  
15
 Such developments have long been foreseen in American scholarship on the development across the 
USA of various legal provisions (e.g. wrongful death statutes applicable to fetal death) with ‘fetal 
rights’ underpinnings. See, for example, Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with 
Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection (1986) 95 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 598; Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights 
(1987) 10 HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL 9. 
 4 
rights jurisprudence, the resultant fetocentricity of maternal care in Ireland, and the 
everyday hardship the status quo causes to pregnant women in Ireland. Finally, the 
article argues that the current momentum for constitutional change in Ireland should 
lead to proposing an amendment to the People that would effectively 
deconstitutionalize fetal rights, positively recognize women’s autonomy, and create 
the space for political judgement to determine the availability of abortion in Ireland. 
II. Abortion in Ireland: The Current Legal Regime 
 
Irish law provides for extremely limited access to abortion. Under Irish law, abortion 
is legally available only where it is required to save the life of a pregnant woman and, 
even then, only once the fetus is deemed not yet ‘viable’.16 Where viability of the 
fetus is established as a matter of medical judgement, pregnancies can be terminated 
by early delivery, for example, but not by means of abortion.
17
 The law as it stands 
takes the form of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution (the 8
th
 Amendment) and the 
Protection of Law During Pregnancy Act 2013. Article 40.3.3 provides the 
constitutional framework for the law regulating abortion in Ireland: 
 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
 
This provision, the introduction of which is discussed in further detail below, permits 
abortion only in very limited circumstances. According to the case of Attorney 
                                                        
16
 Constitution of Ireland (1937), Article 40.3.3; Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013; 
Department of Health, Implementation of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: Guidance 
Document for Health Professionals (2014). 
17
 Doctors in Ireland are under a statutory obligation to “preserve unborn human life as far as 
practicable”, thus where a fetus is viable and the life of the pregnancy woman is at real and substantial 
risk, the pregnancy will be terminated by means of early delivery rather than abortion: Protection of 
Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, s.s. 7(1)(a)(ii), 8(1)(a)(ii), 9(1)(a)(ii). See also Department of Health, 
Implementation of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: Guidance Document for Health 
Professionals (2014); Fiona de Londras & Laura Graham, Impossible Floodgates and Unworkable 
Analogies in the Irish Abortion Debate (2013) 3 IRISH JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 54. In this respect, 
Ireland is unusual in using the term ‘termination of pregnancy’ to refer to both abortion and early 
delivery, whereas other jurisdictions use it to refer to abortion only. 
 5 
General v X,
18
 an abortion is permissible where there is a “real and substantial risk to 
the life of the” pregnant woman, and that risk can only be averted by termination of 
the pregnancy by means of abortion. Whether that is an absolute statement of the 
limitations of abortion under the constitution remains a matter of some contention. 
While the Government takes a conservative approach to the interpretation of Article 
40.3.3 so that it considers the X Case to absolutely delimit the availability of abortion, 
scholars and activists have argued that the state’s obligation to protect fetal life 
extends only “as far as practicable”, so that abortion would be permissible where 
there is a fatal fetal abnormality.
19
 While debate as to the permissibility of abortion 
under such circumstances continues, it is clear that a woman whose pregnancy 
emerges from rape or incest cannot access an abortion under Irish law unless there is 
also a real and substantial risk to her life, notwithstanding her right to access abortion 
under international human rights law in such circumstances.
20
 
 
Although Article 40.3.3 was introduced into the Constitution in 1983, there was no 
statutory provision regulating access to abortion until 2013. Thus, while statute 
criminalized abortion outside of the limited constitutional right,
21
 access to 
constitutionally permissible abortion was left purely to practice and medical 
judgement exercised by doctors who themselves were operating under the ‘chilling 
effect’22 of the criminal law regime. Following the European Court of Human Rights 
decision in A, B & C v Ireland
23
 and the death of Savita Halappanavar as a result of 
                                                        
18
 [1992] 1 I.R. 1. 
19
 See, for example, Ruth Fletcher, Submission to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health, 21 May 
2013. Available online at http://humanrights.ie/criminal-justice/guestpost-ruth-fletchers-submission-to-
the-oireachtas-abortion-hearings/ (last accessed: 17 March 2015). 
20
 See generally, Christine Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—International and 
Regional Standards (2008) 8 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 249; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Ireland, para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014). 
21
 Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
22
 This phrase was used in reference to the criminalization of abortion by the European Court of Human 
Rights: A, B & C v Ireland (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 13, para. 254: “the Court considers it evident that the 
criminal provisions of the 1861 Act would constitute a significant chilling factor for both women and 
doctors in the medical consultation process, regardless of whether or not prosecutions have in fact been 
pursued under that Act”. 
23
 Ibid. 
 6 
sepsis during a protracted miscarriage in a Galway hospital in late 2012,
24
 the 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 was introduced. This Act put in place 
extensive barriers to women’s capacity to access abortion, apparently motivated by 
the belief that the constitutional right to life of the unborn required both 
criminalization of abortion and the imposition of a process that would effectively 
ensure no woman could ‘trick’ the system into providing her with a constitutionally 
impermissible abortion, reflecting the deeply limiting effect of Article 40.3.3 on 
legislative choice. Under the 2013 Act abortion is available in three circumstances 
only: 
 
(a) Two medical practitioners (one of whom is an obstetrician) have certified that 
there is a real and substantial risk to the life of a pregnant woman that 
emanates from a physical illness and which can only be averted by termination 
of the pregnancy
25
 and where the fetus is not yet viable. This certification 
must be done in ‘good faith’, which is understood as cognizance of the need to 
preserve fetal life to the extent possible;
26
 or 
(b) There is an emergency situation in which a single doctor has certified that 
there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant woman that 
emanates from a physical illness and which can only be averted by termination 
of the pregnancy,
27
 and the fetus is not yet viable. This certification must be 
done in ‘good faith’, which is understood as cognizance of the need to 
preserve fetal life to the extent possible;
28
 or 
(c) Three doctors (one of whom must be an obstetrician and one of whom must be 
a psychiatrist) have certified that there is a real and substantial risk to the life 
of the pregnant woman that emanates from a risk of suicide and which can 
                                                        
24
 On the death of Savita Halappanavar see Kitty Holland, Woman Denied a Termination Dies in 
Hospital, 14 November 2012, THE IRISH TIMES. Available online at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/woman-denied-a-termination-dies-in-hospital-1.551412 (last accessed 
17 March 2015). 
25
 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, s. 7. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, s. 8. 
28
 Id. 
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only be averted by termination of the pregnancy,
29
 and the fetus is not yet 
viable. This certification must be done in ‘good faith’, which is understood as 
cognizance of the need to preserve fetal life to the extent possible.
30
 
 
The viability element of these tests is implicit, rather than being expressly outlined in 
the legislation, and emanates from the constitutional provision of an ‘equal’ right to 
life to ‘the unborn’ and ‘the mother’. 31  Abortion outside of these three, strictly 
regulated circumstances constitutes the criminal offence of ‘destruction of unborn 
human life’ under s. 22 of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. Section 
22 provides: 
 
22. (1) It shall be an offence to intentionally destroy unborn human life.  
(2) A person who is guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on 
indictment to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, or 
both.  
(3) A prosecution for an offence under this section may be brought only by or 
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
Importantly, under s. 22, criminalization extends not only doctors but also women 
who purchase abortifacients online and take them in the privacy of their own home, 
reportedly a common approach to unwanted pregnancy in Ireland.
32
 All of this 
constitutes one of the strictest abortion regimes in Europe: rape, incest, risk to health 
(mental or physical), economic circumstances, even fatal fetal abnormalities that will 
result either in death in utero or a short and painful life for the child if the pregnancy 
                                                        
29
 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, s. 9. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Article 40.3.3; Fiona de Londras, Suicide and Abortion: Analysing the Legislative Options in Ireland 
(2013) 19(1) MEDICO-LEGAL JOURNAL OF IRELAND 4; Fiona de Londras & Laura Graham, Impossible 
Floodgates and Unworkable Analogies in the Irish Abortion Debate, (2013) 3(3) IRISH JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 54; Department of Health, Implementation of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy 
Act 2013: Guidance Document for Health Professionals (2014). 
32
 See Carol Ryan, Abortion by Post, 15 March 2011, THE IRISH TIMES. Available online at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/abortion-by-post-1.573017 (last accessed 17 March 2015). 
 8 
is brought to term are quite simply irrelevant. Abortion is permitted only where the 
pregnant woman will, almost certainly, die without it. 
 
The criminal law regime does not end there. While women have a constitutional right 
to travel to access an abortion
33
 and to information on abortion
34
 (both secured only in 
1992
35
), a medical professional based in Ireland cannot refer a pregnant woman to a 
clinic in England, or make an appointment for her in such a clinic. To do so is a 
criminal offence under the Regulation of Information (Availability of Services 
Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995. Section 8(1) of that Act 
provides that “it shall not be lawful” for a medic or counselor (or their employees or 
agents) to “make an appointment or any other arrangement for or on behalf of a 
woman with a person who provides services outside the State for the termination of 
pregnancies”. 
 
Simply put, only a woman who is dying and incapable of travelling has an abortion in 
Ireland. For everyone else, purchasing abortifacients illegally, travelling to another 
state in order to access an abortion, or simply resigning oneself to the pregnancy are 
the only options. This is exacerbated by the fact that, although there is no formal 
border between Northern Ireland (which is part of the United Kingdom) and the 
Republic of Ireland, the Abortion Act 1967 (the Westminster law) does not apply in 
Northern Ireland.
36
  
                                                        
33
 Constitution of Ireland (1937), Article 40.3.3 (“This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel 
between the State and another state”). 
34
 Id., (“This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such 
conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another 
state”). 
35
 These provisions were inserted into the Constitution by the 13
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments to the 
Constitution in December 1992. The 1992 referendum is discussed further below. 
36
 The Abortion Act 1967 was never adopted in Northern Ireland. Thus, abortion remains a criminal 
offence in that jurisdiction as per the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Criminal Justice 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1945 (s. 25). Following the decision of R v Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, abortion 
is permitted in Northern Ireland where a “doctor is of the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with 
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to 
make the woman a physical or mental wreck” (at p. 694), which has been interpreted as permitting 
abortion where there is a risk that continuing the pregnancy would have a real and serious detrimental 
 9 
 
III. The Constitutionalization of Fetal Rights in Ireland 
 
The current law on abortion in Ireland, outlined above, is clearly framed by Article 
40.3.3 of the Constitution. However, that provision is of a relatively recent 
provenance. When Ireland became a Free State in 1922, and then introduced 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Constitution of Ireland) in 1937, abortion had been 
prohibited in Ireland, as in other parts of the United Kingdom, since the promulgation 
of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 58. This made it a serious offence—
punishable by life imprisonment—to procure a miscarriage: 
 
Every Woman, being with Child, who, with Intent to procure her own 
Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any Poison or other 
noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means 
whatsoever with the like Intent, and whosoever, with Intent to procure the 
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with Child, shall 
unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any Poison or other 
noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means 
whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony, and being convicted 
thereof shall be liable, at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal 
Servitude for Life or for any Term not less than Three Years,—or to be 
imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without Hard 
Labour, and with or without Solitary Confinement. 
 
Although 1937 marked the introduction of a new constitutional order in Ireland, this 
did not sever all links with the pre-existing laws or repeal the statute book in toto.
37
 
                                                                                                                                                              
impact on the pregnant woman’s health, or where it is required to save the life of the pregnant woman. 
This position was reaffirmed in In the Matter of an Application by the Society for the Protection of 
Unborn Children for Judicial Review [2009] N.I.Q.B. 92. 
37
 Between the establishment of the Irish Free State and the introduction of the 1937 a transitional 
constitution—the Constitution of the Irish Free State—operated. It did not include any reference to 
abortion, but did carry the pre-existing statute book over into the post-partition legal order. On the Free 
State constitutional order see, for example, Leo Kohn, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE 
(1932). On women’s citizenship under the 1922 Constitution see Caitriona Beaumont, Women, 
 10 
Rather, laws that were not expressly repealed were automatically carried over, 
although they were susceptible to being challenged for incompatibility with the Irish 
Constitution and, if found to be incompatible, to being struck down.
38
 Thus, from the 
emergence of the modern Irish state in 1937 until the Protection of Life During 
Pregnancy Act 2013, abortion was criminally prohibited in Ireland under the 1861 
Act.  
 
The anchoring of the prohibition of abortion in a colonial-era law ought not to be 
taken to suggest that the criminalization of abortion was or is a colonial yoke from 
which the Irish polity has struggled to escape. The prohibition of abortion was happily 
carried into Irish law in 1937 and, indeed, not permitting abortion was closely bound 
up in the self-identifying Catholicism of the Irish state at the time,
39
 the strength of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Citizenship and Catholicism in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948 (1997) 6(4) WOMEN’S HISTORY 
REVIEW 563. 
38
 Constitution of Ireland (1937), Article 50. 
39
 Although Ireland is a constitutionally secular state, the Preamble to the Constitution (which has not 
been amended), indicates the religiosity of the state as founded. It provides  
 
“In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final 
end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, 
We, the people of Éire, 
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained 
our fathers through centuries of trial, 
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful 
independence of our Nation, 
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and 
Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order 
attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution”. 
 
In addition, the Constitution as originally introduced included the following provision as Article 44.1.2: 
“The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the 
guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens”. By Article 44.1.3 “The State also 
recognize[d] the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in 
Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other 
religious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this 
Constitution”. Article 44 was removed in its entirety by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, 
 11 
which stood in sharp contradistinction to the Protestantism of ‘England’, especially in 
a proximate post-colonial context in which to be Irish was, to a significant extent, to 
be ‘not English’.40 As considered further in Part VII below, the narrative of abortion 
as an ‘un-Irish’ phenomenon has continued, in various forms, since then. 
 
Although there are reports that women based in Ireland did access abortion within the 
jurisdiction,
41
 as a general matter there was no strong organized movement for 
abortion to be legalized in Ireland in the early days of the state. Until the mid- to late-
1970s, women in Ireland had little autonomy: contraception was effectively 
unavailable, and its importation was a criminal offence;
42
 abortion was criminalized;
43
 
women who got pregnant outside of marriage frequently found themselves detained in 
institutions, usually run by the Catholic Church, such as Magdalen Laundaries and 
‘Mother and Baby Homes’;44 there was no equal pay or other employment equality 
legislation, upon marriage women were required to leave state-funded employment,
45
 
                                                                                                                                                              
approved by referendum in December 1972. On religion and the Irish Constitution generally see EOIN 
DALY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE IRISH STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN CONTEXT (2012). 
40
 See Siobhán Mullally, Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland (2005) 27(1) HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 78; Ruth Fletcher, Post-Colonial Fragments: Representations of Abortion in Irish Law 
and Politics (2001) 28 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 568. 
41
 See, for example, Anne O’Connor, Abortion: Myths and Realities from Irish Folk Tradition in 
AILBHE SMYTH (ED), THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND (1992), p. 57. 
42
 This was criminalized under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935, which was struck down by the 
Supreme Court in McGee v Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284. The availability of contraception was 
then regulated by the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, discussed below. 
43
 Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
44
 On the confinement of ‘deviant’ women in Ireland see, for example, Una Crowley and Rob Kitchin, 
Producing ‘Decent Girls’: Governmentality and the Moral Geographies of Sexual Conduct in Ireland 
(1922-1937) (2008) 15(4) GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE: A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST GEOGRAPHY 355, 
James M. Smith, The Politics of Sexual Knowledge: The Origins of Ireland’s Containment Culture and 
the Carrigan Report (1931) (2004) 13(2) JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 208, Brian Titley, 
Magdalen Asylums and Moral Regulation in Ireland in ANTHONY POTTS & TOM O’DONOGHUE, 
SCHOOLS AS DANGEROUS PLACES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2007), at p. 119. 
45
 The ‘marriage bar’, as it was called, only impacted on a small number of women, but was part of a 
broader pattern of economic disenfranchisement of women. On this see Caitriona Beaumont, Gender, 
Citizenship and the State in Ireland, 1922-1990 in DAVID ALDERSON, FIONA BECKET, SCOTT 
BREWSTER & VIRGINIA CROSSMAN, IRELAND IN PROXIMITY: HISTORY, GENDER AND SPACE (1999), at 
p. 95. 
 12 
and the Minister for Industry and Commerce had the power to limit the number of 
women employed in any industry;
46
 divorce was unavailable;
47
 there was practically 
no provision for women in the event of marital breakdown;
48
 and the Constitution 
reinforced highly gendered expectations of women as caregivers and mothers.
49
 
Ireland was, in other words, a deeply conservative country in which Catholicism held 
a steady grip, politics and the professions of law and medicine were dominated by 
conservative men who themselves were often heavily influenced by senior members 
of the Catholic Church,
50
 and political movements for women’s empowerment and 
effective participation struggled to achieve purchase in the public square.
51
 In this 
context, one would imagine that there would have been little impetus for a movement 
focused on constitutionalizing fetal rights in Ireland in order to prevent possible 
decriminalization of abortion; it simply seemed like an impossibly remote prospect. 
 
Notwithstanding that, domestic and international developments together resulted in 
the emergence of just such a movement.  
The 1983 Referendum and Introduction of the 8
th
 Amendment 
 
In the early 1970s the US Supreme Court interpreted the right to privacy as including 
a (not very extensive) right to access abortion in Roe v Wade;
52
 a development that 
followed an assertion of the right to access contraception in Griswold v Connecticut.
53
 
This immediately made anti-abortion campaigners in Ireland anxious that something 
                                                        
46
 Conditions of Employment Act 1935, s. 16. 
47
 Divorce was constitutionally prohibited until 1995. It now permitted, subject to very strict 
requirements, by virtue of Article 41.3.2 of the Constitution and the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1995. 
48
 See YVONNE GALLIGAN, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND: FROM THE MARGINS 
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similar to Roe might emerge in Ireland. In Ireland, the constitutional right to privacy 
had already been developed into a right to access contraception, which resulted in the 
criminalization of importing contraception being struck down in the case of McGee v 
Attorney General.
54
 In that case, Walsh J. in the Supreme Court had expressly 
endorsed the view that the constitution was a living, dynamic document that had to 
develop with society.
55
 Following McGee, the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 
was introduced to allow doctors who did not hold a relevant conscientious objection 
to prescribe contraceptives for ‘bona fide family planning purposes’ (generally 
interpreted as meaning ‘to married couples’). 56  The legalization of contraception, 
together with McGee and the US Supreme Court’s decision in Roe, caused anxiety 
among anti-abortion campaigners,
57
 notwithstanding the fact that at the time they 
were concerned, as O’Carroll has written, with abortion in theory rather than in 
practice.
58
  
 
At this time—in the early 1980s—Irish politics was enormously volatile. There had 
been numerous fragile governments in a small number of years and the country was 
on the brink of economic and, frankly, political collapse.
59
 It was in this context that 
the Pro Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) was founded, which quickly became “the 
most powerful campaigning group in recent Irish history”.60 This was the perfect 
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context in which to extract political promises and, following two years in which 
“[p]rofessional associations, cultural organizations, community associations, women’s 
groups and political parties were all forced to state their position [on abortion], amid 
an atmosphere of increasing tension and ‘moral blackmail’”,61 PLAC managed to 
secure a commitment for a constitutional referendum on abortion.
62
 Not only that, but 
the lobby and the Catholic Church had clear influence over the wording to be put to 
the People; a wording that, as outlined above, constitutionalized fetal rights in Ireland. 
In late 1983 the 8
th
 Amendment was put before the People. 
 
The 1983 abortion referendum is widely regarded as one of the most brutish and 
bruising in the history of (strangely ferocious) constitutional referenda in Ireland;
63
 
the tone of public debate was, frankly, intolerably intolerant, to the extent that an 
editorial in the Irish Times described it as “the second partitioning of Ireland”.64 The 
anti-abortion campaign was astonishingly well resourced, while the pro-choice side 
scrambled to fundraise. Furthermore, at that time the Catholic Church remained a 
fiercely influential, if not dominant, social and political force and priests across the 
country preached for a ‘Yes’ vote at churches.65 
 
Although the turnout was low, a huge majority (66.9%) of those who voted supported 
the amendment, and thus Article 40.3.3, the 8
th
 Amendment to the Constitution, was 
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enacted. This amendment, which constitutionalized fetal rights, “identified the people 
of Ireland as protectors of the foetus”;66 a position that persists, at the level of rhetoric 
at least, to this day. 
The X Case and the 1992 Referendum 
 
Barry Gilhealy argues “The anti-abortionists were able to score with such devastating 
success in the early 1980s because of the residual strength of tradition in the political 
culture, despite the rapid social change of the previous two decades”.67  That residual 
traditionalism and conservatism manifested itself in the narrow and highly restrictive 
interpretation and application of the 8
th
 Amendment in order to prohibit travel for 
abortion and the provision or receipt of information about abortion, as well as the 
cultivation of massive social stigma and significant amount of fear for women who 
were desirous of terminating their pregnancy. As the jurisprudence on the 8
th
 
Amendment, which is considered in detail in Part IV demonstrates, the right to life of 
the unborn was elevated to effectively the highest constitutional position, and there 
was no “public language with which to conceptualise the relationship between woman 
and foetus”68 beyond that of fetal rights. In this, the 8th Amendment was remarkably 
successful in structuring Irish abortion law around a “cultural and official recognition 
of foetal rights”.69  
 
However, while anti-abortion activists such as PLAC considered that the 8
th
 
Amendment had made it impossible for abortion to ever be legally provided for in 
Ireland, developments in the early 1990s challenged that understanding. In 1991, a 
14-year-old pregnant rape victim, subsequently known as ‘X’, and her parents 
travelled to the UK in order for her to obtain an abortion. Before they had completed 
the procedure they contacted the Gardaí [Irish police force] to ask whether DNA 
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evidence from the aborted fetus might be useful as evidence in the prosecution of her 
rapist. This led to the Attorney General being informed and, as the fetus in this case 
had a constitutional right to life, he instituted proceedings to secure an injunction to 
prevent the young girl from getting an abortion abroad; a decision he explained by 
reference to his duty, on behalf of the State, to protect the constitutional rights of the 
fetus.
70
 The victim and her parents returned to Ireland for the hearing, and the High 
Court issued the injunction on the basis of the unborn’s constitutional right to life. 
There followed massive protests and general public outcry.
71
  
 
Although the electorate had approved of Article 40.3.3 by referendum, the baldness of 
a concrete set of facts starkly illustrated just how restrictive that wording could be, 
resulting in an outcome that many had not anticipated, i.e. the literal confinement of a 
teenage child who had been raped and claimed to want to kill herself for the purposes 
of ensuring the fetus would be born alive. So fractious was the atmosphere after the 
High Court decision that the government reportedly asked the child’s family to appeal 
and offered to pay all of the costs,
72
 and on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the High Court.
73
 In this decision, which has come to be seen as defining 
the contours of abortion law in Ireland, the Court held that abortion was permissible 
under Article 40.3.3 where “it is established as a matter of probability that there is a 
real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother, which 
can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy”.74 That risk could take the 
form of a risk of suicide, as well as a risk emanating from physical illness.
75
 X was 
thus permitted to travel in order to avail of an abortion.  
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The anti-abortion lobby was deeply displeased with the Court’s interpretation of 
Article 40.3.3. This reading of the 8
th
 Amendment was not, they argued, congruent 
with what had been intended when the referendum was passed. Where a woman’s life 
was at risk from a physical illness, treatment that would result in the death of a fetus 
may be administered, although that was not generally categorized as abortion and was 
said be within the contemplation of Article 40.3.3 from its inception. However, a risk 
of suicide was seen as being qualitatively different. This was a risk, it was argued, 
from which a woman could be protected without the pregnancy being terminated and 
in relation to which termination would have to take the form of deliberate destruction 
of the fetus (rather than being a ‘side effect’ of treatment as in the case of physical 
illness). Writing in the Irish Times shortly after the Supreme Court decision, William 
Binchy—himself an architect of the 8th Amendment and, at the time, the Regius 
Professor-elect of Laws in Trinity College Dublin—opined “The Supreme Court…has 
introduced an abortion regime of wide-ranging dimensions, beyond any effective 
control or practical limitation…In practice, no prosecution of an abortionist will have 
any real prospect of success if the woman seeking an abortion has threatened 
suicide”. 76  Shortly thereafter a campaign to have the Constitution amended took 
shape.  
 
The original proposal emanating from anti-abortion campaigners was that Article 
40.3.3 be amended to expressly prohibit “intentional abortion”, which Binchy said 
would bring the Constitution “in line with the intentions of those who voted for the 
[8
th] Amendment in 1983”.77 Under this proposal, a risk of suicide could not be a 
basis for constitutionally permissible abortion. Rather, Dr Catherine Bannon claimed, 
a pregnant woman who expressed suicidal intentions could be admitted to hospital 
(involuntarily, if need be) “where she can be watched, receive psychiatric therapy and 
[be] safeguarded against herself”.78 
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Unlike in the early 1980s, however, the political parties took control of the situation 
and wording for three referenda was proposed without consultation with the Catholic 
Church and with cross-party agreement to reject any wording proposed by the anti-
abortion lobby.
79
 Three constitutional changes were proposed to the People: to ensure 
abortion was not available on the basis of suicidal ideation/risk on the part of the 
pregnant woman, to provide for a right to travel, and to provide for a right to 
information. The travel and information rights were approved in the referendum, 
adding two further clauses to Article 40.3.3, but the proposed 12
th
 amendment was 
unsuccessful. That proposed amendment would have removed the 1983 text and 
replaced it with the following: 
 
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such termination 
is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where 
there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real and substantial 
risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction. 
 
This proposed amendment was clearly intended to reverse the Supreme Court’s 
decision but, as the People rejected it (65.35% against, 34.65% in favor), the 8
th
 
Amendment, as interpreted in the X Case, remained in place.  
The 2002 Referendum 
 
In 2002 the Government proposed a complex constitutional amendment on abortion. 
The proposed 25
th
 amendment to the Constitution was presented as a package of 
reforms in the area of ‘crisis pregnancy’. The proposed amendment had four main 
parts: (i) to ensure that life was protected from the moment of implantation (as 
opposed to conception), (ii) to require the Oireachtas [Parliament] to pass the 
proposed Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act 2002 within 180 days of the 
referendum, (iii) to grant that proposed Act constitutional protection so that, in future, 
it could only be amended by referendum of the People, and (iv) to permit abortion 
where it was necessary to prevent loss of the pregnant woman’s life other than where 
the threat to her life was a risk of suicide (i.e. to undo this element of the X Case). The 
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proposed 25
th
 Amendment was, thus, extraordinary (inasmuch as it intended to 
effectively enshrine a piece of primary legislation in the Constitution which does not 
have any other similar provision) and divisive (both by defining constitutional life 
from implantation rather than conception and by proposing to reverse the ‘risk of 
suicide’ element of the X Case). The very particularly divisive nature of this proposal 
was reflected in the fact that, rather unusually for a proposed constitutional change in 
Ireland, it did not have the support of all of the main political parties. In fact, only the 
Government parties (then Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats) supported it 
while all other main parties (Fine Gael, Labour, The Green Party, and Sinn Féin) 
opposed it. Furthermore, not all anti-abortion groups supported the proposed 
amendment; rather ‘pro-life’ posters and campaigners were divided. So, too, was the 
country. In a startlingly close referendum vote in March 2002 50.4% of those who 
turned out voted ‘no’, while 49.6% voted ‘yes’. Thus, the Constitution remained 
unchanged, and the text today is as was introduced in 1983 (8
th
 Amendment) together 
with the information and travel amendments from 1992 (13
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments). 
 
IV. Implications for Law: Fetal Rights Jurisprudence post-1983 
  
The constitutionalization of fetal rights in Ireland has had significant implications for 
women’s rights, not least through the superior courts’ expansive and deeply 
conservative interpretation of its provisions and their reach. Such interpretation is 
shaped by the form of Article 40.3.3 itself. One of the most striking aspects of the text 
of Article 40.3.3 is its omission of the word ‘woman’; instead, pregnant women are 
described as mothers, reclassified from the moment of conception from ‘woman’ to 
‘mother’ and, as a consequence, to someone whose rights to autonomy, bodily 
integrity, agency and self-determination are subordinated to the right to life of the 
fetus she is carrying.
80
 Lisa Smyth notes that such structuring of rights discourse 
flows from framing access to abortion as a matter of a ‘right to choose’ and 
prohibition on abortion as a matter of ‘fetal rights’.  
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For Smyth, the claim that the fetus is a rights-bearer means that it “must be 
constructed as morally equivalent to women”,81 which in turn works itself out in three 
key claims: 1. That the fetus is morally equivalent to a woman per se (i.e. is a rights-
bearer), 2. That the fetus is morally superior to an “involuntarily pregnant, and 
implicitly sexually guilty, woman”, i.e. can makes a rights claim against her rights 
claim, and 3. That the right to choose carries less moral weight than the claim of a 
fetal right to life.
82
 The jurisprudence interpreting Article 40.3.3 bears out the 
production of these key narratives in Ireland. This jurisprudence largely emanates 
from an aggressive strategy of litigation by anti-abortion groups, targeting access to 
information and freedom of travel in order to prevent women in Ireland from 
accessing abortion abroad, as well as ‘at home’ in Ireland, on the basis of the duty to 
respect and vindicate the fetal right to life now contained in Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution. Much, although not all, of this jurisprudence was developed prior to the 
X Case, i.e. when it was generally considered that the 8
th
 Amendment absolutely 
prohibited abortion in every circumstance. 
Travel and Information 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, before the internet allowed for information to be 
accessed with relative ease, women who were contemplating travelling in order to 
access abortion were limited to trying to acquire information through the various 
volunteer telephone services run by women based in the UK
83
 (although the non-
universal availability of telephones and dependence on operator exchanges in some 
parts of the country made this difficult
84
) or by consulting with counselors and doctors 
at Open Door and Well Woman clinics, primarily located in Dublin. These 
organizations would provide one-on-one counseling and advice to women who were 
experiencing what was then called ‘crisis pregnancy’, including informing them about 
the availability of abortion in the UK, names and locations of clinics, and making 
contact on their behalf should that be desired. The information about abortion as an 
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option was non-directive; the decision lay with the woman herself. However, in the 
eyes of some anti-abortion campaigners, even the mere provision of non-directive 
information threatened the constitutional right to life of the fetus. Without such 
information, women would not be able to access abortion and so, they argued, the 
state was obliged to prevent such information provision in order to properly defend 
and vindicate fetal rights.  
 
In the late 1980s the Attorney General took a case at the relation of the Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children Ireland (SPUC), seeking an injunction preventing 
Open Door Counselling and the Well Woman from providing such information on the 
basis that their activities were unlawful by reference to Article 40.3.3. The High Court 
issued this injunction and, in doing so, made clear the extensive effects of the 8
th
 
Amendment.  
 
In Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling Limited and the Wellwoman 
Centre Ltd,
85
 Hamilton P. started his judgment with the words “The right to life of the 
unborn has always been recognised by Irish law”, 86  deeming it to have been 
recognized by common law, statute, and “as one of the unenumerated personal 
rights”87  protected by the Constitution, as well as now having express protection 
under Article 40.3.3. In doing so, Hamilton P. construed criminal prohibitions on 
abortion as being statements of a fetal right to life, thus constructing a pedigree for 
such a rights claim that far predated the constitutional amendment of 1983 and, 
indeed, the judicial pronouncements of such a right from before that amendment.
88
 
Although the defendants argued that holding the provision of (non-directional) 
information and support to women who wished to explore abortion as an option to be 
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unlawful would be to effectively extend the criminalization of abortion to the UK, 
where it was lawful when administered under the Abortion Act 1967, the Court was 
unconvinced. In this respect Hamilton P. held: 
 
It seems to me that, where there is a breach of or interference with a 
fundamental and personal and human right, such as the right to life of the 
unborn, which is acknowledged by the Constitution, and which the courts are 
under a constitutional obligation to defend and vindicate, it would be 
scandalous if the legitimacy or criminality of such breach or interference 
could, in the words of the late Kingsmill-Moore J. in Mayo-Perrott v Mayo-
Perrott [1958] I.R. 336 at p. 350 of the report – “be decided by a flight over St 
George’s Channel”89 
 
Having found that advising, informing and supporting women contemplating abortion 
“impl[ies] assent to, approval of and encouragement for the procurement of an 
abortion if the pregnant woman so wishes and the provisions of the Abortion Act, 
1967, are complied with”,90 Hamilton P. went on to declare that he had “no doubt”91 
that this was unlawful by reference to Article 40.3.3. According to Hamilton P: 
 
…[the] right to life of the unborn includes the right to have that right 
preserved and defended and to be guarded against all threats to its existence 
before and after birth…it lies not in the power of a parent to terminate its 
existence and…any action on the part of any person endangering that life [is] 
necessarily not only an offence against the common good but also against the 
guaranteed personal rights of the human person in question.
92
 
 
Thus, the rights of women to information, association, travel, and bodily autonomy 
were deemed entirely subordinate to the right to life of the fetus. For the period of a 
pregnancy, women became constitutional mothers whose unborn children were the 
bearers of constitutionalized rights that were protected with the full weight of the law, 
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in sharp contradistinction to those rights through which she could exercise equal 
citizenship and autonomy. In spite of the evident extremity of the implications of 
Hamilton P.’s decision in this case, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the 
appeal against this decision. The appellants argued that the right to receive and impart 
information was an unenumerated right, but in response Finlay CJ held that he was 
“satisfied that no right could constitutionally arise to obtain information the purpose 
of the obtaining of which was to defeat the constitutional right to life of the unborn 
child”.93 A hierarchy of rights had been firmly established. 
 
The Open Door Counselling case clearly indicated the extent to which the 8
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution could, and would, impinge women’s autonomy in 
respect of their reproductive decisions. Not only, under this amendment, could 
women not acquire an abortion ‘at home’ in Ireland, but their ability to find out about 
abortion services available abroad was also sharply constrained. Neither could they 
travel to acquire an abortion. Organizations such as Open Door Counselling and 
Wellwoman were, thus, prevented from distributing or providing information to 
women who were left effectively in an information vacuum. While some UK-
published magazines that were sold in Ireland contained advertisements about 
abortion services in that jurisdiction, attempts by students’ unions to step into the 
breach and address the information deficit under which women now suffered were 
also restrained by the courts. In litigation again initiated by SPUC,
94
 the Supreme 
Court confirmed that the prohibition on the provision of information outlined in Open 
Door Counselling was not limited to instances of one-on-one information provision 
but also governed the provision of general information in published form. According 
to Finlay C.J. in SPUC v Grogan, “It is clearly the fact that such information is 
conveyed to pregnant women, and not the method of communication which creates 
the unconstitutional illegality, and the judgment of this Court in the Open Door 
Counselling case is not open to any other interpretation”.95 
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As already noted, these decisions were based, to a large extent, on the contention that 
there was absolutely no right to access an abortion in Ireland regardless of the 
circumstances. However, as outlined above, Attorney General v X confirmed that the 
8
th
 Amendment had not introduced quite so total a prohibition. Rather, there was a 
limited right to access abortion in Ireland where the life, as opposed to the health, of a 
pregnant woman was at real and substantial risk that could only be averted by 
termination of the pregnancy. In a later case, again concerning SPUC and the students 
unions, Denham J. in the Supreme Court held that the decision in Open Door 
Counselling was flawed, it having been based on an incorrect premise as to the 
meaning of Article 40.3.3.
96
 This may well have led to an almost unworkable 
situation in which women who did have a constitutional right to access abortion under 
the test outlined in X were entitled to travel and information, but those who did not 
were not. However, in constitutional referenda held in 1992 this unfeasible 
eventuality was avoided by the confirmation within the Constitution of a right to 
travel and a right to access information, which all women would enjoy whether they 
fell into the category of those constitutionally permitted to access abortion in Ireland 
or not. Notwithstanding this, important elements of the pre-1992 jurisprudence 
remain, particularly the categorization of the right to life of the unborn as being a 
superior right within the hierarchy of constitutional rights to the rights to information 
and travel that might be said to be enjoyed by a pregnant woman and as being 
recognized, but not created, by the 8
th
 Amendment given its provenance as asserted 
by Hamilton P. in Open Door Counselling. 
Fetal Best Interests 
 
Although it was originally thought that Article 40.3.3 dealt solely with abortion, its 
wording is clearly broader than that: not only does it prohibit the introduction of 
widely-available abortion, but it establishes an autonomous constitutional right to life 
of the fetus. The reach of that fetal right to life is broad, and it continues to operate 
even where the right to life of the pregnant woman—expressly recognized in Article 
40.3.3—no longer exists, i.e. where the pregnant woman is clinically dead, but a fetal 
heartbeat remains. As the recent case of PP v HSE
97
 illustrates, this autonomous fetal 
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right to life can result in ‘fetal best interests’ and ‘fetal welfare’ principles being 
applied to questions as to the medical care of the pregnant woman in a way that may 
justify the imposition of extreme, dehumanizing, undignified and highly invasive 
treatment.  
 
PP concerned a young woman who suffered brain stem death when she was 15 weeks 
pregnant, on 3 December 2014. She was then placed in intensive care and, although 
clinically dead, was supported by mechanical ventilation, very heavy doses of 
medication, and physiotherapy. The purpose of these interventions including a 
tracheostomy carried out on 17 December 2014, was “to facilitate the continuation of 
maternal organ supportive measures in order to attain foetal viability”,98 which was 
likely to be 32 weeks.
99
 The plaintiff, who was the father of this woman, sought a 
court order discontinuing such intervention, which he considered to be unreasonable, 
experimental, and unethical. The evidence to the Court, which sat to consider this 
case in Christmas week of 2014, was harrowing.  
 
The woman’s body was in a rapidly deteriorating state, her living children were 
extremely distressed by her appearance, her brain was undertaking a process of 
liquefaction, she had an open wound in her skull from which brain tissue was 
extruding and where there was evidence of fungal infection, she had cardiovascular 
instability, and numerous further infections. One of the medical experts who testified 
in the case stated that, given the extremely poor medical condition of the pregnant 
woman, continuing treatment would “be going from the extraordinary to the 
grotesque”.100 In spite of this, it was clear that withdrawing care would result in the 
death of the fetus, and the question for the court was whether that was permissible 
under Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. 
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In considering this, the Court placed great weight on the prospects of survival of the 
fetus, by which was meant the prospect of it being born alive without regard to the 
quality or duration of life that would follow said birth.
101
 In this respect, and having 
regard to the extensive medical evidence presented, the Court found that “the 
prospects for a successful delivery of a live baby in this case are virtually non-
existent”102  and that “there is no realistic prospect of continuing somatic support 
leading to the delivery of a live baby”.103 Having made this finding of fact the Court 
proceeded to consider whether Article 40.3.3 permitted withdrawal of are in this case. 
 
In doing so, the Court focused to a large degree on the ‘as far as practicable’ 
limitation clause in the constitutional text and confirmed indications in earlier 
jurisprudence that this meant the state was not required to do that which was futile, 
impractical or ineffective in order to protect the fetal right to life.
104
 While women 
had a right to dignity in death, “when the mother who dies is bearing an unborn child 
at the time of her death, the rights of that child, who is living, and whose interests are 
not necessarily inimical to those [of the woman to die with dignity], must prevail over 
the feelings of grief and respect for a mother who is no longer living”.105 Having 
established this, the Court went on to establish that “the question that must be 
addressed is whether even if such measures are continued there is a realistic prospect 
that the child will be born alive”.106 Drawing on the jurisprudence of wardship in Irish 
courts, the Court then held that decisions as to care in this case ought to be made by 
reference to fetal best interests, bearing in mind that “[g]iven the unborn in this 
jurisdiction enjoys and has the constitutional guarantee of a right to life, the Court is 
satisfied that a necessary part of vindicating that right is to enquire about the 
practicality and utility of continuing life support measures”.107 Given that, in this case, 
“[t]his unfortunate unborn has suffered the dreadful fate of being present in the womb 
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of a mother who has died, and in which the environment is neither safe nor stable”108 
and “has nothing but distress and death in prospect”109, it was considered to be “in the 
best interest of the unborn child”110 to permit somatic care to be withdrawn.  
 
Although a number of commentators criticized the Heath Service Executive for 
having engaged in litigation in PP, claiming that the somatic care in this case could 
have been withdrawn without the need for litigation,
111
 both the judgment itself and 
the medical evidence presented to the Court illustrate that it is quite possible that a 
woman who was brain dead would be maintained by court order in order to ensure the 
fetus reaches viability and could be delivered alive. This only adds further to the 
uncertainty under which medics must operate: when would Article 40.3.3 require such 
intervention and when could care be withdrawn? Is this now to be determined only by 
Courts? As claimed by Dr Peter Boylan giving evidence to the Court, the lack of 
guidance as to how the 8th Amendment works in such cases was a material 
consideration in the decision to both prolong the somatic care and engage in litigation; 
a situation that seems likely to repeat itself in similar cases in the future.  
 
The relevance of Article 40.3.3 to such cases is confirmed by the Court’s finding that 
this provision is not limited in its application to abortion; rather, “the provision, in its 
plain and ordinary meaning may also be seen as acknowledging in simple terms the 
right to life of the unborn which the State, as far as practicable, shall by its laws 
defend and vindicate”. Furthermore, this case makes it entirely clear that whether or 
not to withdraw support in such a case is determined solely by reference to whether 
the fetus will be born alive; it was the fact that there was no prospect of live birth that 
made maintaining care more than that which was “practicable” by reference to Article 
40.3.3. Another set of facts could have led to another finding; what mattered was the 
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Court’s determination of what was in the best interests of the fetus in order to achieve 
its live birth (without regard to the quality or duration of life post-birth). 
V. Implications for Medicine: Fetocentricity in Decision-Making  
 
The potential implications of the finding in PP that ‘foetal best interests’ should be 
taken into account in making decisions as to maternal medical care are extraordinarily 
far-reaching: if the fetal right to life takes precedence over a woman’s health, 
autonomy and bodily integrity (which it does under Article 40.3.3), and if that fetus 
also has a ‘best interest’ in being born alive that must be taken into account, PP may 
conceivably pervade medical decision-making throughout a pregnancy, giving a 
crystallized legal form to the practice of fetocentric medical care that pregnant women 
receive in Ireland. This practice is illustrated by cases of ‘fatal fetal abnormality’, 
situations in which pregnant women require medical treatment that may result in the 
death of the fetus but where there is not (yet) a real and substantial risk to the 
pregnant woman’s life, and the apparent willingness to override a woman’s refusal of 
consent in order to preserve fetal life. As well as these particular situations, 
considered further below, there are fresh indications that Article 40.3.3 is being given 
an extremely wide interpretation in some hospitals, impacting on decisions as to 
referrals for particular procedures abroad. For example, it has been reported that in 
one major hospital referrals abroad for pre-implantation genetic diagnosis have been 
stopped;
112
 a situation that has clear implications for women’s maternal healthcare, 
reproductive choices, and access to the best available standard of healthcare. 
Fatal Fetal Abnormalities  
 
The term ‘fatal fetal abnormality’ is now used in Ireland to refer to fetuses that suffer 
from a condition that means they are highly unlikely to be born alive or, if born alive, 
will almost certainly have a short life and suffer from a serious medical condition.
113
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Women in Ireland who find themselves pregnant in such circumstances and who wish 
to terminate the pregnancy rather than continue to term cannot avail of an abortion in 
Ireland because, following on from the X Case, Article 40.3.3 has been interpreted as 
allowing for abortion only where there is a risk to the life of the pregnant woman. 
This is notwithstanding the fact that the term “as far as practicable” might reasonably 
be interpreted as permitting of abortion where there is practically no likelihood of the 
fetus being born alive.
114
 Indeed, to some extent the availability of abortion in such 
circumstances is arguably suggested by the decision in PP v HSE, discussed above. 
However, the Court in PP was careful to limit its decision in that case to its own 
particular facts, so that no general principle of the permissibility of abortions in such 
cases can be reasonably extracted from it. 
 
However, neither the government nor the present Attorney General have endorsed 
these more liberal interpretations, and medics operate on the understanding that 
abortion is not permissible in Ireland in cases of fatal fetal abnormalities. Thus, in 
cases where there is little prospect of a baby being born alive, or surviving for long 
after birth, doctors may advise patients of the option to terminate and provide 
information about abortion, although they can neither provide that abortion in Ireland 
with the patients’ family and friends around to support them, nor refer them 
specifically for a termination in the UK.
115
 Rather, pregnant women in these situations 
must travel for an abortion should they decide to terminate their pregnancy.  
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Not only does this reflect a remarkably narrow interpretation of the Constitution, but 
it also imposes severe burdens on such women, who are already in very difficult 
positions. First of all, as already mentioned, no doctor, nurse or medical professional 
in Ireland can arrange a referral for such a woman to a hospital or clinic in the UK 
where an abortion could be carried out. Second, women in these situations must carry 
additional financial and emotional burdens (as all women who travel for abortion do, 
discussed below), and it is reported that women increasingly have the first part of the 
procedure undertaken in the UK and then “deliver” the deceased fetus in an Irish 
hospital.
116
 Notwithstanding this, doctors based in Ireland are left without any options 
to help their patients in these situations; they can merely inform them that there are 
hospitals in the UK where they might be able to access abortion and provide care for 
them on their return. The continued criminalization of abortion under the Protection 
of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 means that doctors will not, and cannot, use their 
medical judgment to determine whether or not a given situation might permit of 
abortion in Ireland under PP, for example; rather such a case would have to be 
determined by court order—a step too far for many women and couples in such 
situations.  
 
Sick, but not (yet) Dying 
Where women who are pregnant require medical treatment that may result in the 
death of the fetus but where there is not (yet) a real and substantial risk to life, what 
the European Court of Human Rights has called the ‘chilling effect’117 of providing 
treatment that may result in the death of the fetus can operate to determine medical 
decision-making. In such cases, even though termination of the pregnancy would be 
best for the health of the pregnant woman, and even though not terminating the 
pregnancy may contribute towards her health deteriorating, current medical practice 
in Ireland appears to be such that the pregnancy would not be terminated.
118
 This 
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reflects the great difficulties that the constitutionalization of fetal rights has given rise 
to for medics in Ireland; as Dr Rhona Mahony, the Master of the National Materntiy 
Hospital has put it: 
From a medical perspective, [Article 40.3.3] creates difficulty in its 
presumption hat the implications of a range of complex medical disorders can 
be reduced to a matter of individual right. If the legal word explores the 
balance of rights, the medical world explores the balance of risk…The 
wording of the Eighth Amendment is sufficiently ambiguous that there is a 
real risk that medical imperative could be hindered by an emphasis on balance 
of rights rather than survival [of the pregnant woman].
119
 
This was especially starkly illustrated by the case, and death, of Savita Halappanavar.  
The death of Savita Halappanavar in a Galway hospital took place before the 
enactment of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. Ms. Halappanavar 
was admitted to hospital while suffering a miscarriage 17 weeks into her pregnancy; 
there was no prospect of the fetus surviving, although there was a fetal heartbeat at 
the time. Reports suggest that she requested termination of the pregnancy by means of 
abortion as soon as the diagnosis became clear, but because her life was not in “real 
and substantial danger” at the time, and the fetus still had a heartbeat, this request was 
denied. This continued over a period of almost three days, during which time the 
clinical approach was “to ‘await events’ and to monitor the fetal heart in case an 
accelerated delivery might be possible once the fetal heart stopped”. 120  Ms 
Halappanavar developed a very serious form of sepsis, the advance of which was not 
adequately diagnosed or treated. Although a diagnosis of septic shock led to fetal 
remains being removed on October 24th, the infection worsened and she died on 
October 28, 2012.  
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An independent inquiry found that a mixture of factors was relevant in this case, 
including the lack of clear clinical and legal guidance. The inquiry thus 
... strongly recommend[ed] and advise[d] the clinical professional community, 
health and social care regulators and the Oireachtas to consider the law 
including any necessary constitutional change and related administrative, legal 
and clinical guidelines in relation to the management of inevitable miscarriage 
in the early second trimester of a pregnancy including with prolonged rupture 
of membranes and where the risk to the mother increases with time from the 
time that membranes are ruptured including the risk of infection and thereby 
reduce risk of harm up to and including death.
121
  
Although some claimed that this case illustrated failures in medical care, rather than a 
difficulty with the 8
th
 Amendment, Enright and de Londras have argued that the 
constitutional position was relevant in the clinical decisions taken in this case and the 
death of Savita Halappanavar: 
This case was dominated by the sense that even an inevitable miscarriage 
could not be terminated as long as there was foetal heartbeat on the basis that a 
real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant woman must first arise. This 
interpretation of the Constitution clearly played into both Savita 
Halappanavar’s protracted suffering and her death…the reality is that the 
threshold for access to abortion in Ireland is so high that even a serious illness 
is likely to be managed along similar lines, regardless of the outcome for the 
woman.
122
 
Overriding Consent 
 
Although it did not involve abortion per se, the decision in PP v HSE, considered 
above, is entirely congruent with this reading of what happened to Savita 
Halappanavar: great lengths may be gone to in medical care to preserve fetal life 
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without regard for whether this will result in the best medical outcomes for the 
pregnant woman. Nor, it appears, is the consent of the pregnant woman to such 
treatment a key issue: Savita Halappanavar expressly requested an abortion, and the 
patient in PP was clinically dead and could neither consent nor refuse consent to the 
invasive ‘treatment’ to which her body was subjected. In some cases, the Health 
Services Executive has attempted to override a pregnant woman’s lack of consent by 
applying for court orders for treatment that was oriented towards maintaining fetal 
life.  
 
The case of ‘Miss Y’ illustrates this trend. Although the case is subject to strict 
reporting requirements, the following appears to be clear from the publicly available 
information. Y was an asylum seeker who arrived in Ireland and, shortly afterwards, 
discovered that she was pregnant as a result of a wartime rape in her country of origin. 
She made it clear to all those with whom she came into contact that she did not want 
to proceed with the pregnancy and that, if forced to do so, she would kill herself. For 
reasons that are not entirely clear, no referral for assessment was made under the 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 until she was approximately 20 weeks 
into the pregnancy. Although the assessment then appears to have proceeded with 
appropriate speed, and the medical assessment panel found that there was a real and 
substantial risk to her health under s. 9 of the Act, it was considered that the fetus was 
viable or close to viability so that an abortion ought not to be carried out. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that she requested an abortion and did not want to carry the 
pregnancy to full term.  
 
In protest at the apparent unavailability of abortion in her case, Y went on a food and 
liquid strike, thus putting fetal health at risk, in response to which the HSE acquired 
court orders for forced nutrition and hydration. Although, it appears, Y eventually 
agreed to eat and take hydration, the fact that such court orders were sought and 
granted indicates the extent to which fetal welfare can influence medical treatment. 
This is all the more stark in this case as, as an asylum seeker, Y could not easily travel 
to the UK to acquire an abortion even if she could get the funds together for same 
(and, as considered below, asylum seekers are not permitted to work and thus cannot 
earn money in Ireland). Once the pregnancy had progressed further—reportedly to 24 
weeks—it was terminated by means of a cesarean section.  
 34 
 
While no court order was acquired to authorize this invasive procedure, suggesting 
that Y consented to it, clear questions arise as to the capacity of a young, suicidal 
woman who had been denied an abortion that she wanted, did not speak much 
English, was in a highly vulnerable position, had been raped, and was living within 
Ireland’s punitive asylum system to truly consent to such a procedure. 
 
All of these cases illustrate the fact that the 8
th
 amendment has resulted in a 
jurisprudential reclassification of women as constitutional subjects once they become 
pregnant: at that point medical and legal priority shifts to the fetus, the protection of 
which, Supreme Court jurisprudence has declared, is in pursuance of the “public 
interest”.123 In contrast, the protection and vindication of pregnant women’s rights 
seemingly is not, or at least not when they can be said to be in conflict with fetal 
rights or, indeed, the nascent concept of fetal best interests. This is the jurisprudential 
and medical consequence of constitutionalizing fetal rights, and it is a state of affairs 
that causes real hardship for women in Ireland. 
 
VI. Implications for Women: The Illusion of ‘Choice’ and the Reality of 
Hardship  
 
The cases considered in Parts IV and V above demonstrate the pervasiveness of fetal 
rights thinking, anchored in constitutionalized fetal rights, in the fleshing out of the 
legal content and implications of Article 40.3.3 and in difficult situations of medical 
care. While pregnant women’s constitutional rights to information and travel have 
now been established by the 13
th
 and 14
th
 amendments, pregnant women in Ireland 
can be subjected to violations of their rights to bodily integrity,
124
 freedom from 
inhuman and degrading treatment,
125
 privacy,
126
 access to adequate healthcare,
127
 and 
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reproductive autonomy
128
 through the state’s vindication of constitutionalized fetal 
rights.  
 
In order to avoid this, many women in Ireland who wish to access abortion travel, 
primarily to the UK.  Indeed, the availability of abortion in England (under the 
Abortion Act 1967) and the relative ease of travel between Ireland and the UK due to 
the common travel area and, now, the abundance of low-fare flights, have allowed for 
the illusion and the language of choice to enter into the Irish abortion debate. It is not, 
the argument goes, that women in Ireland cannot have abortions; it is, rather, that 
women cannot have abortions in Ireland. This sleight of hand, which contrives to 
present Irish women as having reproductive autonomy, deliberately elides the fact that 
while there may be, what Gilmartin and White term, a constitutional right to be an 
abortion tourist in Ireland, this “ignores the differentiated politics and mutual 
constitution of mobility and gender” so that “[w]omen differently located within 
contemporary Ireland’s socioeconomic hierarchies experience this mobility in 
different ways”.129  
 
Travelling for an abortion is not easy: it is time consuming, costly, and often lonely. 
The practicalities of arranging for an abortion may well result in a woman getting a 
later, and thus more expensive and more dangerous, abortion. The practical 
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considerations of cost alone are not insignificant; on average, it costs a woman in 
Ireland £1,000 to go to the UK for an abortion.
130
 Although there are some volunteer 
organizations that can help women who do not have the capacity to cover this cost 
themselves,
131
 the Irish state does not provide any financial assistance or reimburse 
costs as it does with many other forms of medical treatment provided abroad because 
it is not available (at all or in the required time) in Ireland. As well as this, women 
who already have children may have to arrange childcare, and women with jobs will 
have to take time off of work. Poor women are, clearly, particularly disadvantaged in 
this context. So too are asylum seeking women who are not entitled to work, and thus 
have very limited independent resources, and who also must wait to have a special 
visa for travel arranged. The visa process alone costs between €120 and €240 and can 
take up to eight weeks and, of course, a visa can be refused.
132
 While women are 
entitled to after-abortion in Ireland, many women experience abortion stigma and do 
not seek out medical care or, indeed, support from friends and family. 
 
Much of this, many women must do alone; as already noted, it is a criminal offence to 
“promote” abortion and arrange a referral to a clinic. 
 
Thus, while the proximity of a jurisdiction in which abortion is available has allowed, 
to some extent, the Irish government to continuously retreat from addressing abortion 
availability in a meaningful way within Ireland itself, the distance across the Irish Sea 
is great indeed for many women in Ireland. In reality, the ‘choice’ to travel in order to 
have an abortion is, for many, utterly illusory. With this as the context within which a 
reported 158,252 women with Irish addresses accessed abortion in England between 
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1980 and 2013,
133
 one must wonder how many women had no option but to attempt 
abortion by other means or continue with an unwanted pregnancy.  
VII. Towards a Referendum on the 8
th
 Amendment 
 
For most Irish people, and many Irish politicians, the dissonance between the 
constitutional myth of an abortion-free Ireland and the reality of Irish reproductive 
choice is a stark one indeed.
134
 High profile cases illustrating the sharpness and 
pervasiveness of the constitutionalized fetal right to life, such as those discussed 
above, bring that particularly to the fore. So too does the plight of women and couples 
who have had to travel to the UK (or further afield) to terminate a pregnancy in the 
case of fatal fetal abnormality. Desire, perhaps even demand, for change is palpable, 
with the claims that a change must come generally coalescing around the issues of 
pregnancy emanating from rape and incest, as well as cases of fatal fetal abnormality.  
 
This has been evident in a succession of opinion polls over recent months. The most 
recent of these polls suggest that support for some constitutional change in the context 
of abortion is especially strong. According to a Sunday Independent/Millward Brown 
poll in September 2014, 75% of those surveyed were in favor of holding a referendum 
to repeal the 8
th
 Amendment and 69% believed abortion should be available in cases 
of rape.
135
 An Irish Times/Ipsos MORI poll held in October 2014 largely reproduced 
this picture, with 68% of those surveyed being in favor of holding a referendum on 
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whether to allow abortion in cases of rape and fatal fetal abnormality.
136
 While such 
polls do not, of course, indicate that a referendum to change the constitutional status 
quo would necessarily be successful, they do indicate that there is significant desire 
for the question of the constitutional provision to be revisited. There is also significant 
political momentum, in at least some quarters, towards a referendum.  
 
While some have focused on attempting to bring about change through legislation 
(such as through a private members bills to allow abortion in cases of fatal fetal 
abnormality
137
), the general political consensus is that any reform whatsoever requires 
constitutional change. The current coalition government has made it clear that it has 
no intention of revisiting the question of abortion during its tenure (scheduled to end 
in 2016),
138
 but two parties—the Labour Party139 and Sinn Féin140—have officially 
voted in favor of constitutional reform, thus making repeal of the 8
th
 Amendment a 
core element of their party policies for the next general election.  
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While this level of momentum is notable, its substantive scale ought not to be 
overstated. The emergent consensus for constitutional change appears to be gathering 
around abortion in very limited circumstances: rape, incest, fatal fetal abnormality, 
perhaps serious risk to health. What has not yet come fully to the fore of public 
discourse is a demand for constitutional recognition of women’s reproductive 
autonomy as a general matter (i.e. beyond these limited situations); something that 
tends to suggest that the illusion of choice may well carry more purchase than it is 
due, and that the constitutionalization of fetal rights continues to dominate political 
and popular imagination in respect of reform and, thus, to greatly curtail the 
possibilities for constitutional change. 
 
For any referendum that results in the constitutional recognition of women’s 
autonomy and their re-reclassification from ‘mother’ to ‘woman’ to succeed, this is a 
phenomenon that must be grappled with, and one that may significantly frame both 
the form of the proposed change that is put to the people and the nature of the 
discourse during the referendum campaign itself.  
 
Referenda are a very particular part of Irish political life; they are rarely proposed 
without cross-party consensus around their wording, and they tend to result in an 
impassioned public debate.
141
 That debate is itself framed by constitutional 
requirements of ‘balance’ in terms of the expenditure of public funds and the 
allocation of time by public broadcasters when discussing the issues in question.
142
 In 
practice, these legal constraints mean that discussions as to ‘social issues’ tend to take 
place between those representing the more polarized ends of the debate, with little 
‘middle ground’ discussion taking place in the ‘public square’. As mentioned above, 
the 1983 referendum was preceded by two years of intense lobbying to force 
associations and institutions to make their position on the question of abortion clear. 
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Although the Roman Catholic Church is unlikely to play as prominent a role in any 
such referendum campaign in the future as it did in 1983, the anti-abortion lobby 
remains well organized and very well resourced, and a prominent institution, the Iona 
Institute, which is founded on Catholic ethos has an extremely high-profile public 
presence in all debates on ‘social’ issues. Thus, while it seems unlikely that a future 
referendum would take on quite the tone of previous ones, two important trends that 
were present in those campaigns are likely to inform any forthcoming campaign: the 
representation of abortion as ‘un-Irish’ and externally imposed, and the language of 
‘fetal rights’. 
 
Abortion has long been represented as utterly alien to Irish morality and the Irish way 
of life, with fetocentrism and the constitutionalization of fetal rights marking a 
particular moral position of the Irish people and state. In the campaign leading to the 
referendum on the 8
th
 Amendment in 1983, this took on a manifestly ‘anti-English’ 
tone, with abortion being represented as a tool of colonial oppression.
143
 One famous 
poster in this campaign makes that representation manifest; it carried the line ‘The 
Abortion Mills of England Grind Irish Babies into Blood that Cries Out to Heaven for 
Vengeance’, and some claimed that any attempt to liberalize abortion law in Ireland 
was at danger of turning Ireland back into a mere province of the United Kingdom.
144
 
 
Although the tone had changed by the time of the referendum of 1992, it remained the 
case that abortion was represented as an external ‘threat’ to Ireland’s particular moral 
position on fetal life. In this context the representation (and the fear) was that EU law 
might result in Ireland being forced to legalize abortion. To some extent this flowed 
from the ways in which the European Court of Justice decision in Grogan was 
represented.
145
 This case, discussed in its domestic legal incarnation above, concerned 
whether or not abortion was a service as understood within the Treaty of Rome, such 
that any restrictions on abortion (including travel and information) might be violation 
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of the Treaty and thus invalid, even if they took constitutional form. The European 
Court of Justice held that abortion is a service as understood within the Treaty of 
Rome and, thus, that parties who had a profit making (or commercial) connection to 
the provision of this service could not be impeded in their activities in terms of the 
distribution of information by means of advertisement.
146
 Although Grogan et. al. did 
not benefit form this (as they were students unions with no profit-making connection 
to the service in relation to which they were distributing the information and, thus, no 
claim to do so that could be based in European law), this case resulted in a perception 
of EC law (as it then was) as a threat to the constitutional protection of fetal rights in 
Ireland. 
 
This became significant in the context of the 1992 referendum, which followed the X 
Case, because at the time the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was also under 
consideration and it emerged that Ireland had negotiated a protocol to the Treaty that 
made it clear none of its provisions would interfere with Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution.
147
 Much uncertainty and debate about the legal effect of this protocol 
then emerged, which threatened to derail the effort to secure popular support for 
ratification;
148
 indeed, Jennifer Spreng has noted that the referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty “became a preliminary de facto vote on abortion rights”. 149 
Abortion has continued to play a role in EU Treaty referenda since, with the concern 
that the EU might ‘impose’ abortion liberalization persisting in spite of there being no 
evidence of this being likely or, even, possible.
150
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By the 2000s the discourse had shifted somewhat, from virulent anti- and post-
colonial sentiment, to a deep concern with the extent to which international human 
rights law might ‘impose’ an obligation to liberalize abortion law on Ireland. In spite 
of the fact that abortion and access thereto is a matter on which there is extremely 
limited normative content in international human rights law, and one on which the 
European Court of Human Rights has not articulated a clear position vis-à-vis either 
Article 2 (the right to life) or article 8 (the right to private and family life),
151
 even 
minimalist interventions from the international legal order were met with suspicion 
and near-hostility by the anti-abortion lobby. This is exemplified by the reaction to 
the European Court of Human Rights decision in A, B & C v Ireland.
152
  
 
In that case the European Court reiterated that it was for the member state to decide 
the extent to which abortion would be available in the domestic legal system;
153
 this 
was a matter on which the state had such a wide margin of discretion that a strongly 
held national position against liberal abortion provision could override European 
consensus as to availability.
154
 However, as the Court had previously held,
155
 where 
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the law does allow for abortion, it must be practicable for women within the state to 
avail of it. As Irish law allowed for abortion where the life of a pregnant woman was 
subject to a real and substantial risk, the lack of any guidance for medics and women 
to determine whether abortion was lawfully permissible in any given case was a 
violation of the Convention.  
The reaction in Ireland was strong. The Catholic Church urged the state not to 
legislate in response to the decision, arguing instead that a new referendum to narrow 
abortion provision ought to be proposed to the People.
156
 Prominent intellectuals and 
commentators who subscribe to a Catholic ethos spoke about how international 
human rights law did not per se require the state to provide for abortion,
157
 arguing 
that any demand for liberalization of abortion from international human rights law 
was in contrast with the ethics and morals of the Irish position.
158
 The immediate 
reaction of the government was to establish an Expert Committee to consider how to 
respond to A, B & C 
159
 and, ultimately, the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
2013 was passed.  
 
The passage of this Act was not without controversy; debate about whether or not to 
include a risk of death from suicide—an issue that remained deeply controversial 
since X—was widespread, and the lack of a time limit on life-saving abortion caused 
consternation in some cases, with one Cabinet Minister ultimately losing her position 
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in government and the party whip by refusing to vote in favor of the legislation.
160
 
Amidst all of this controversy, the Act itself was represented repeatedly as being the 
government’s response to the Strasbourg Court’s judgment, rather than being a 
mechanism for giving effect to the will of the people as contained in Article 40.3.3 
and interpreted by the Supreme Court. The narrative of external imposition thus 
continued, even in respect of legislation that in fact had been called for by Irish courts 
for more than two decades,
161
 and the possibilities of which were sharply constrained 
by constitutionalized fetal rights and the Government’s interpretation of the 
restrictions that Article 40.3.3 imposed. 
 
That conservative interpretation and the limited and punitive nature of the 2013 Act, 
outlined in Part I, reflects the fact that the insertion of a fetal right to life in the 
Constitution in 1983 resulted in abortion in Ireland becoming dominated by a 
discourse of rights in which fetal rights and women’s rights were placed in contest 
with one another. The textual ‘equality’ of the right to life of the fetus and of the 
pregnant woman was subverted by a jurisprudence in which the state, through the 
modality of litigation and court order, was constructed as being seized of the 
responsibility to protect and vindicate fetal rights, which was supported with this state 
power in order to override women’s rights except in the narrowest of circumstances, 
determination of which is now strictly regulated by legislation and resides entirely 
with medics;
162
 the views of pregnant women have little, if anything, to do with it. 
The construction of abortion as a matter of rights, and particularly of fetal rights, has 
been—and remains—strikingly successful in Ireland, and is an important element in 
understanding the narrative that presents abortion as ‘un-Irish’, in the manner 
considered above.  
 
Even if sufficient momentum can be raised for a constitutional amendment to be put 
to the People in a referendum, securing a proposed wording that moves us away from 
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fetal rights as the core animating concern will be a significant challenge. However, 
achieving that is, surely, necessary. There are two reasons for this: first, perpetuating 
constitutionalized fetal rights will in turn perpetuate a jurisprudence and practice that 
causes considerable material harm to women and violations of their rights; second, 
maintaining constitutionalized fetal rights would mean that space for political and 
personal judgement about abortion, as both a general and an individual matter, would 
remain severely curtailed.  Should either of these situations persist, constitutional 
change would fail to address adequately the hardships that the 8
th
 Amendment has 
rendered on women in Ireland. 
 
As outlined above, the 8
th
 Amendment and its aftermath have imposed significant 
burdens on women in Ireland. Although contraception is widely available and the 
morning after pill is generally available throughout the country (albeit it at different 
price points and after a one-on-one consultation with a pharmacist), women in Ireland 
do not have reproductive autonomy. The extremely limited availability of abortion, 
combined with the financial and other burdens of travelling abroad to access abortion 
where it is desired, mean that in practice as well as in law women are denied agency 
in respect of the continuation of a pregnancy. This is true not only of women whose 
pregnancies emanate from extremely repressive circumstances (such as rape and 
incest), or where a medical condition means that the fetus will not be born alive or 
survive for very long if born alive (i.e. cases of fatal fetal abnormality), but for all 
women who experience pregnancy in Ireland.  
 
Furthermore, the 8
th
 Amendment fundamentally shapes the contours and possibilities 
of medical decision-making beyond the context of abortion per se. The newly 
developed concept of fetal best interests has potentially wide-reaching effects for 
medical practice, which is already deeply affected by the ‘two patient’ approach that 
emanates from having to practice medicine not only on a woman but also on a 
constitutionally-defined rights-bearing fetus. Pregnant women in Ireland are thus 
deeply impacted by the 8
th
 Amendment, whether they want to access an abortion or 
not (although the inability to access abortion is at the heart of that impact). The 
fetocentricity of obstetric medical practice in Ireland is deeply connected to the 
presence of Article 40.3.3 in the Constitution. Women who are ill may not receive 
required medical interventions because of a fear of impermissible interference with 
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fetal life. Women who are dead may be artificially sustained in order to provide a 
‘uterine environment’ for fetal development. Women who wish to have an abortion 
cannot get a referral from a clinician.  
 
Article 40.3.3 is about far more than abortion. Its reach is wide. Its impact is deep. 
And women exclusively feel its impact. That is the lived experience that any reform 
of abortion law in Ireland must confront and in order to do so effectively the discourse 
of rights must be reoriented in the context of abortion. That is the real impact of 
constitutionalizing fetal rights. 
IIX. Conclusion: Possible Constitutional Change in Ireland 
 
It is clear from the above analysis that no meaningful reform of Irish abortion law is 
possible without constitutional change, but that the form of constitutional change 
itself is important. If the question of abortion in Ireland is to be reshaped in a 
meaningful way, then a movement away from a dominant discourse of fetal rights is 
necessary, and that can only be achieved by replacing constitutionalized fetal rights 
with a constitutional recognition of women’s autonomy and the opening up of 
political space for the availability of abortion in Ireland to be determined on the basis 
of politics, policy and evidence.  
 
For some, the primary aim is the repeal of the 8
th
 Amendment (often advocated 
together with repeal of the provisions on travel and information), without any 
replacement in the text of the Constitution itself. Such an approach, while attractive in 
its simplicity, seems insufficient to clearly and unequivocally ‘deconstitutionalize’ the 
matter of abortion.
163
 First, as outlined above, there is a pre-1983 jurisprudence on the 
right to life of the unborn, which would not be clearly disrupted by the removal of 
Article 40.3.3. Rather, it is arguable that the unenumerated right to life of the unborn 
could be resurrected in the event of a simple repeal without replacement. Were that to 
be the case, then arguments about the need to restrict travel and information—which 
could be made if the travel and information provisions were also repealed—could 
well be made in a manner that would be jurisprudentially convincing. Furthermore, 
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the welfare/best interests of the fetus approach advocated in PP v HSE and discussed 
above may well survive such a repeal, with all of its attendant potential for shaping 
maternal care in Ireland.  
 
It is true, and important to note, that this seems somewhat unlikely; were a majority of 
those who turned out to vote to support the removal of Article 40.3.3 from the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court would almost certainly see in that an intention to 
remove a constitutional protection for the right to life of the unborn as a general 
matter. However, predicting the circumstances in which this unenumerated right 
might make an appearance in argumentation before the Court is extremely 
challenging and, should it be successfully argued, the implications may well be wide-
ranging. It would seem, thus, sensible to suggest that a ‘mere’ repeal may well be 
insufficient for the purposes of deconstitutionalizing abortion in Ireland. 
 
Furthermore, a simple repeal would not reorient the discourse of abortion law and 
regulation in Ireland away from fetal rights. As argued above, the fetocentrism of the 
discourse of abortion in Ireland is directly related to the constitutionalization of fetal 
rights. It was through the legal codification of a fetal right to life that the courts and 
politics have developed an approach to abortion in which protection of the fetus, 
rather than recognition of women’s autonomy and the value of reproductive justice, 
has been the primary concern. Thus, reorientation of the discourse away from fetal 
rights is of fundamental importance. This cannot clearly be achieved through simple 
repeal, not only because an unenumerated right to life for the fetus may remain within 
the constitutional acquis but also because the constitution would remain devoid of an 
expression of the value of women’s autonomy, independence, and control over 
reproduction. Thus, repeal and replacement would appear to be more appropriate. 
 
What form, then, might a constitutional amendment that appropriately takes women’s 
lived experiences, the need to shift away from a fetal rights discourse, and a 
commitment to reproductive justice take? I argue that a replacement text that 
expressly endorses a reproductive justice approach, and leaves room for political 
judgement and contestation is to be preferred. Such a statement should be open, and 
include a provision recognizing that ‘the availability of abortion shall not be 
unlawful’. An express endorsement of a reproductive justice approach is desirable for 
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the reasons outlined above and effectively shifts the constitutional discourse away 
from an almost-exclusive focus on fetal rights; rather, it creates space in which the 
political process can liberate itself from the pre-determination of questions about 
abortion that Article 40.3.3 currently imposes and, indeed, creates an imperative for 
Irish politicians to finally use their judgement to regulate abortion provision in 
Ireland. It may well be, that this judgement would result in a limited abortion law 
regime in Ireland, but even if that were the case it would be the product of a reasoned 
political debate in which effective deliberation as to the regulation of abortion in 
Ireland was engaged in.  
 
Although it is argued that Article 40.3.3 reflects ‘the will of the People’, its capacity 
to creep into all areas of maternal care was not foreseen and, in any case, the lived 
experience of women in Ireland stands in such sharp contrast to the absoluteness of 
the 8
th
 Amendment that there is a strong democratic argument in favor of revisiting 
the matter, not least because the Irish people have never been presented with a 
proposed constitutional change that would liberalize the legal regime in a meaningful 
way. For that constitutional change to be meaningful it must deconstitutionalize fetal 
rights, recognize women’s autonomy, commit the state to reproductive justice, and 
leave the space for politics to determine the future of Irish abortion law.  
 
This difficult tale of abortion law and fetal rights jurisprudence in Ireland since 1983 
starkly demonstrates the risks that come with constitutionalizing fetal rights. 
However, the greatest challenge has yet to be confronted: to unshackle political 
imagination from the structure and language that constitutionalized fetal rights have 
embedded in the Irish legal, political and medical cultures. The suffocation of such 
imagination may well transpire to be the greatest hurdle to reform and, for the 
architects of the 8
th
 Amendment, their greatest achievement. 
